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Resumen 
 
La literatura sobre pánicos bancarios reduce todo mecanismo de coordinación que de lugar 
a los ataques a puntos solares exógenos. Presentamos una versión de equilibrio general de 
dichos modelos en la cual la incertidumbre a la que los agentes económicos se hallan suje-
tos es modelizada de forma explícita, de manera que los pánicos surgen como resultados 
óptimos de equilibrio correspondientes a juegos de coordinación Bayesianos jugados por 
agentes racionales antes de depositar sus fondos en el banco. Diferencias en los conjuntos 
de información entre el banco y sus clientes dan lugar a pánicos racionales auto-
contenidos en equilibrio. La coexistencia de diversas creencias probabilísticas en equi-
librio, así como la naturaleza auto-contenida de los ataques, derivan del principio de la 
mano invisible de Adam Smith. Los pánicos obtenidos no violan el principio de revelación. 
 
Palabras clave: pánicos bancarios, ataques autocontenidos, juegos de coordinación Ba-
yesianos, principio de revelación, principios de la mano invisible. 
Abstract 
 
The literature on bank runs reduces all coordination mechanisms triggering attacks on 
banks to exogenous sunspots. We present a general equilibrium version of these models 
where the uncertainty faced by depositors is modeled explicitly, such that bank runs arise 
as optimal equilibrium outcomes corresponding to Bayesian coordination games played by 
rational agents before depositing. Differentials in information sets between the bank and 
its depositors lead to rational self-contained equilibrium runs. The coexistence of different 
beliefs in equilibrium jointly with the self-fulfilling nature of the attacks follow from Adam 
Smith's invisible hand principle. The runs obtained do not violate the revelation principle. 
 
Key words: bank runs, self-contained attacks, Bayesian coordination games, revelation 
principle, invisible hand principle. 
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1. Motivation and Stylized 
Facts 
 
There exists a recognized relationship between 
currency crises and bank runs, the latter pre-
ceding the former, defining the most recent 
financial speculative episodes in economic 
history, namely the Mexican and Asian crises. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) provide ample 
empirical evidence illustrating this causality. 
The second generation currency crises litera-
ture, see Cole and Kehoe (2000), developed 
after Obstfeld's (1994) seminal paper, empha-
sizes the behavior of agents as the driving 
force behind the attacks in their models. 
Though multiple equilibria are allowed, and 
the one leading to an attack is generated by an 
exogenous sunspot variable, rationality pre-
vails on the expectations formation process of 
agents and safe areas based on the value of 
fundamentals are defined. The literature on 
bank runs, on the other hand, relies heavily on 
sunspot variables to explain the phenomenon,1 
or eliminates it from the equilibrium out-
comes.2 The strategic behavior of agents is 
generally recognized but not studied explic-
itly.3  
 
In order to explain the above empirical rela-
tionship, bank runs and currency crises were 
both initially modeled as sunspot phenomena. 
Since it seems plausible to assume that most of 
the agents participating in the currency attacks 
were also involved in the preceding bank runs, 
both types of models provided a consistent 
explanation for the entire cycle defining specu-
lative attacks. An exogenous sunspot affects a 
set of depositors, who run on their corre-
sponding banks, destabilizing the financial 
structure of the economy. This is followed by 
an attack on the currency, by mostly the same 
agents who run previously on the bank, which 
further destabilizes the banking system, caus-
ing additional runs, and so on. Even though 
fundamentals play a crucial role modifying the 
expectations of agents through the different 
currency attack areas, the attack is ultimately 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Peck and 
Shell (2003). 
2 Green and Lin (2000) and (2003), design sequentially efficient 
run-proof contracts, but their model is subject to a monitoring 
the monitor problem in the sense defined by Krasa and Villamil 
(1992). 
3 Exceptions to this rule are Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and 
Samartin (2003). However, the set of assumptions needed to 
generate their results, consisting of confounding multiple equi-
libria, may seem too restrictive and applicable only in particular 
cases. 
generated by a sunspot variable that coordi-
nates agents on the corresponding equilib-
rium. This idea gained acceptance due to the 
fact that recent speculative episodes took place 
when fundamentals were not bad enough to 
justify rational attacks on the currency, while 
no attacks had occurred when fundamentals 
displayed relatively worse values.  
 
The sunspot hypothesis defining sequential 
self-reinforcing attacks on the banks and cur-
rency of a country provided a coherent expla-
nation for both phenomena until Morris and 
Shin published their paper in 1998. Specula-
tive attacks on currencies were no longer de-
fined uniquely by sunspot variables, but were 
allowed to be the consequence of rational be-
havior coupled with imperfect information and 
noisy signals.4 This result opened a theoretical 
paradox that has not been closed yet. Assume 
that agents are rational utility maximizers who 
have access to a given information set that is 
updated at each point in time. These agents, in 
their role as depositors, run on the bank if, 
and only if, the attack is coordinated on the 
realization of an exogenous sunspot variable, 
for a given value of the fundamentals. Bank 
runs are followed by speculative attacks on the 
currency of the corresponding country. How-
ever, as shown by Morris and Shin, attacks on 
the currency are based on signals about the 
state of the economy received by depositors 
after running on the bank. The financial sys-
tem will send a negative self-fulfilling signal, 
which derives directly from the run triggered 
by the same agents observing the signal, on 
which the decision of whether or not to attack 
the currency will be based. The positive cycli-
cal behavior described above implies that theo-
retically rational agents stop the attack on the 
currency to analyze a set of signals that they 
have just generated by previously running on 
the bank, based on an exogenous sunspot vari-
able. That is, the current state of the literature 
defines rational attacks on a currency that 
cannot be generated by sunspot-based runs on 
the banks of the corresponding country. The 
main purpose of the current paper is to solve 
this paradox by defining runs on the financial 
intermediaries of a country as rational equilib-
ria independent of any sunspot variable reali-
                                                 
4 We are obviously referring to the attacks that cannot be justi-
fied by the value of fundamentals. 
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zation. We consider explicitly the information 
structure defined within the standard bank run 
model, and allow for beliefs differentials to 
exist between the bank and its depositors.  
 
Even though the strategic framework used by 
the second generation currency crises litera-
ture is almost identical to the one employed to 
model bank runs, two important differences 
must be considered. First, excluding sunspot 
realizations, the information set of the agents 
modelled in the bank run literature is fixed 
through time,5 while currency speculators are 
allowed to observe signals before making a 
decision. Second, the coordination game that 
speculators play before attacking a currency is 
ignored by depositors when deciding whether 
to run on the bank or not.  
 
The second difference deserves some addi-
tional comments. Agents do play a coordina-
tion game when deciding whether to deposit 
their funds in the bank or to remain in an au-
tarky situation. This game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies where agents 
deposit their funds and decide ex-ante not to 
run on the bank.6 The existence of a financial 
intermediary signals that a coordinated no-run 
equilibrium has been reached among deposi-
tors in the deposit game. Thus, it should be 
clear that the same pre-deposit coordination 
game cannot be used to model the post-deposit 
run coordination problem to which agents are 
subject after depositing funds. While this is 
valid only if the information set of depositors 
remains unchanged, it is incorrect if agents are 
allowed to update their information sets by 
monitoring the bank. In other words, if the 
equilibrium of the game has been chosen by 
the agents beforehand, there is no reason to 
expect a change unless motivated by an ex-
ogenous coordination variable. This point has 
already been made by Alonso (1996) and Jack-
lin and Bhattacharya (1988), where post-
                                                 
5 This is not the case in Alonso (1996) and Jacklin and Bhatta-
charya (1988), where depositors receive signals on which to 
base their withdrawing decision. In this case, runs are entirely 
defined by the state of fundamentals. We explain below why we 
follow a different approach to model bank runs. 
6 The game has an additional equilibrium in mixed strategies as 
shown by Adao and Temzelides (1998), but it does not prevail if 
a strong form of forward induction requirement is imposed on 
the equilibrium. Postlewaite and Vives (1987) showed using a 
similar game that equilibria involving a positive run probability 
exist and are unique. They define three different types of agents, 
as opposed to the general case with only two types, depending 
on their degree of impatience. The most patient type does not 
misrepresent her type even though she knows that less patient 
types will with probability one. This is the case since their 
payoff, though affected by early withdrawals, is still higher 
under truth telling. 
deposit signals defining withdrawal decisions 
are received by depositors. These models as-
sume that signals reflect the true state of fun-
damentals, leading to runs caused entirely by 
negative shocks to the economy. That is, bank 
runs and the subsequent currency attacks 
would be mainly due to bad fundamentals, as 
the first generation currency crises literature 
predicts, see Krugman (1979). However, this 
result is at odds with the empirical irrationality 
exhibited by agents in the crises episodes un-
der consideration, where attacks were coupled 
with relatively good values of the fundamental 
variables.7 
 
We present a general equilibrium model where 
information spreads regarding the expected 
state of the economy generate rational self-
contained bank runs. Information differentials 
between the bank and its depositors lead to the 
design of incentive compatible, state-
contingent, and sequential demand deposit 
contracts that are subject to self-contained 
runs by depositors, whose information sets are 
defined by mean preserving spreads on the 
true expected state observed by the bank. 
These contracts dominate the autarky alloca-
tion, meaning that agents deposit funds even if 
they expect an attack to take place in (at least) 
one of the states of the world. Depositors con-
tain the attack after different payment thresh-
olds, corresponding to the sequential alloca-
tions composing the optimal mechanism de-
signed by the bank, are reached. Containment 
requires the withdrawing line to be observable, 
which allows depositors to update their beliefs 
and infer the realized state of the economy. 
Being able to update their beliefs, agents play a 
series of signalling Bayesian coordination 
games after depositing, whose equilibria are 
defined by a subjective set of certainty equiva-
lent constraints. The equilibria set of these 
games follows directly from the information 
and beliefs held by agents before depositing. 
That is, the set of games is played ex-ante, but 
agents consider all possible (subjective) ex-
post realizations to define their strategies.  
 
If a self-contained run takes place, imposing 
suspension of convertibility would assign an 
inefficient allocation to a subset of depositors 
with probability one. However, and restricted 
to the theoretical framework defined within 
this paper, suspension constitutes an optimal 
containment policy if it is announced after 
                                                 
7 The literature on this subject is quite extensive. See Furman 
and Stiglitz (1998) for a summary of the main results. 
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agents deposit. On the other hand, the opti-
mality of suspension does not necessarily hold 
if a more complex strategic dynamic environ-
ment with multiple banks is considered. We 
provide some basis for further research on this 
topic, since the current paper aims only to 
prove the existence of rational bank runs not 
based on the realization of an exogenous sun-
spot variable.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. A description 
of the strategic environment derived from the 
optimization problem faced by depositors is 
given in section two. Section three introduces 
formally the pre and post-deposit coordination 
structures generated by the bank through its 
sequential mechanism and defines their set of 
equilibria, which allows for the existence of 
rational self-contained runs. Section four illus-
trates numerically the theoretical results pre-
sented in the previous sections. Section five 
deals with suspension of convertibility and 
proposes several extensions of the current 
model. 
 
2. Theoretical Strategic  
Behavior 
 
2.1 INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The basic model follows Peck and Shell 
(2003), who define an identical environment 
to the original one described in Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), except for the fact that a finite 
set of identical agents, N, is assumed.8 This 
assumption allows for monitoring by deposi-
tors through a countable withdrawing line. 
There are three time periods, t=0,1,2. Each 
agent is endowed with one unit of an homoge-
neous good in period zero, which can be 
costlessly stored among periods. There exists a 
production technology that delivers one unit 
of output per unit invested if interrupted after 
one period, and R>1 units of output if the in-
vested unit is kept for two periods.9 Agents are 
subject to an exogenous shock in period one 
defined by the set of possible realizations of a 
given random variable, Λb, with an associated 
probability function f(Λb). To simplify nota-
                                                 
8 Through the paper N will also stand for the cardinality of the 
set. 
9 We are assuming that agents can interrupt their investment 
after one period without suffering any penalty. Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1988) challenge this assumption in a framework 
with interim, as of period one, signals about the stochastic 
returns obtained in period two. This allows them to design 
rational, information-based runs dependent on the expected 
state of fundamentals defining the return. 
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Consider the following probability space (Ω, 
I, F), where every state in the sample space, 
Ω∈ω , determines how many and which 
agents are affected by the shock. Moreover, I is 
a σ-field defined on Ω, and F is a probability 
measure on I. Define a random variable λ on 
the state space as follows  
 
bb N ωλωλ →⊆Λ→Ω :},...,1{:  
 
where b
i
b λλω =  for some i = 1,...,# 
bΛ . 
The symbol # denotes the cardinality of the set 
defined after it, i.e. its number of elements. 
Note that while a given state determines how 
many and which agents are affected by the 
shock, the random variable reports only the 
former component. The number of agents af-
fected by the shock is determined by the reali-
zation of the random variable and is Borel 
measurable with respect to the σ-field I, 
which allows both agents and the bank to infer 
the exact realization of the random variable, 
λ*, in period one upon observing the length of 
the withdrawing line.  
 
The agents affected by the shock become im-
patient, or type 1, and value consumption in 
period one only. The remaining agents, which 
we refer to as patient or type 2, value con-
sumption in both periods. Denote by i
tkc  the 
amount of goods received by a type k agent in 
period t given state i. The state dependent 
utility of each agent is given by 
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where ρ is the rate of time preference,10 
b
iλ represents a given relative state of the econ-
omy, such that bb
i Λ∈λ , defining the utility de-
pendence on the realization of the random 
variable (as well as the sequential nature of the 
set of allocations offered by the bank), and 
ℜ→ℜ+:u  is increasing, twice continuously 
differentiable, and satisfies the Inada condi-
tions, u'(0)= ∞  and u'(∞ )=0. We assume the 
following functional form through the paper  
 
β
β
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with 1>β  everywhere. It is generally assumed 
that before a financial intermediary is created, 
agents maximize expected utility conditional 
on their information set, }),(,,{ abba TfN ΛΛ=Γ , 
where the subscript refers to agent a, and Ta 
stands for the realization of the shock corre-
sponding to agent a. The standard assumption 
regarding the information sets of potential 
depositors is that all of them have identical 
ones. Thus, if a financial intermediary is 
formed, it should inherit the homogeneous 
information set of its depositors regarding the 
expected state of the system, bΛ  and )( bf Λ . 
That is, the potential bank and its depositors 
share information sets, as well as beliefs, ex-
cept for the shock defining the type, which is 
privately observed by each agent and cannot 
be verified by the bank, assumed to be the only 
provider of liquidity in the economy.11 The 
main results obtained in this paper derive from 
relaxing the assumption assigning identical 
information sets to the bank and its deposi-
tors.12    
 
2.2 CONTRACT-INDUCED COORDINATION 
GAMES 
 
Consider the optimization problem faced by 
an altruistic bank, given the previous frame-
work and conditional on its information set, 
)}(,,{ bbb fN ΛΛ=Γ , which is assumed (by the 
bank) to be identical to the one of its deposi-
tors, 
aΓ , except for the privately observed type 
                                                 
10 For simplicity, it is generally assumed that ρ=1. 
11 Jacklin (1987) provides a formal justification regarding the 
inefficiency caused by alternative asset markets introduced 
within the current context. In short, Jacklin (1987) shows that 
the demand deposit contracts designed by the bank achieve 
greater risk sharing than equity shares if trade is restricted 
among agents. 
12 The lack of financial transparency was presented by Furman 
and Stiglitz (1998) as one of the main plausible causes triggering 
the Asian crises. 
realization of the latter ones. Jointly with a 
sequential service constraint, the (assumed) 
altruistic bank maximizes the following value 
function ))(,( bb fV ΛΛ  
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where bΛ# denotes the cardinality of the set of 
possible realizations, 00 =bλ , and )( 1bjbj −− λλ  repre-
sents the number of agents contained between 
two consecutive realizations within bΛ , sub-
ject to the set of budget constraints, which 
must be satisfied bb
i Λ∈∀λ  
 
 
 
and a corresponding mechanism compatibility 
condition. To highlight the difference between 
the standard models studied in the literature 
and the current setting, we present the incen-
tive compatibility constraint, icc henceforth, 
defining the optimal mechanism of the bank13 
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where )( bif λ stands for the ex ante (prior) 
probability assigned to the number of impa-
tient agents being b
iλ , with },...,1{ Nbbi ⊆Λ∈λ . This 
function is generally assumed to be common 
knowledge among all agents, and therefore, 
also between depositors and the bank, in pe-
riod zero. Patient agents update this probabi-
                                                 
13 Obviously, non-negativity constraints are also imposed on all 
consumption allocations. 
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lity in period one, after receiving the type-
determining signal, using Bayes' rule.14 The 
updating process delivers the subjective prob-
ability, as of each agent, of having b
iλ  impatient 
depositors in the system, conditional on the 
agent being patient, )( bibf λ . These probabilities 
are used by depositors to calculate the ex-
pected payoffs on which to base their strategic 
behavior in the post-deposit game generated 
by the bank contract structure that solves the 
previous optimization problem. Beliefs are a 
direct function of )( bif λ , assumed to be 
uniquely defined with the probability space 
and known by all agents. This homogeneity 
assumption implies that depositors share the 
beliefs of the bank, denoted by )( bibf λ , the sub-
script b representing the bank, when defining 
their optimal strategies. 
 
Compare now the incentive compatibility 
equilibrium condition to the set of conditions 
required to guarantee the existence of stable 
equilibria through the set of post-deposit 
games defined for each bw
bΛ≤ #λλ , where 
wλ stands for the number of withdrawing 
agents observed in line and b
bΛ#λ corresponds to 
the supremum of bΛ . 
 
The icc condition is based on the expected 
payoffs that the bank assumes its depositors 
calculate if they are not able to observe the 
length of the line before deciding whether or 
not to withdraw, leading to a static (calculated 
and fixed as of period zero) inequality in ex-
pected payoffs15  
 
(1)              ))],1(([))](([ 11122 +≥ + biibii cuEcuE λλ
 
which defines a unique Bayesian post-deposit 
game and its corresponding equilibrium. The 
ability to observe the length of the withdraw-
ing line leads depositors to (subjectively) gen-
erate a set of post-deposit games for each 
bw
bΛ≤ #λλ , as well as a set of certainty equivalent 
constraints, cec hereafter, defining the respec-
tive equilibria  
 
                                                 
14 Peck and Shell (2003) were the first ones to define explicitly 
the belief formation process of the agents. Endowing agents with 
the ability to generate subjective expected payoffs is essential to 
model strategic interactions among depositors in the post-
deposit game. 
15 It is a known result that the optimal demand deposit contract 
assigns bb
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These equilibrium constraints imply that pa-
tient agents prefer to misrepresent their type if 
the utility derived from the allocation offered 
to the next impatient agent in line is strictly 
larger than the expected utility from waiting to 
withdraw until period two. That is, patient 
agents attack the bank if the allocation re-
ceived by impatient depositors is larger than 
the certainty equivalent corresponding to the 
lottery faced by waiting. The set of lotteries 
from which the cec are derived is based on the 
set of realizations observed by depositors and 
their subjective beliefs, updated following 
Bayes' rule conditional on the number of with-
drawing agents in line. Upon direct observa-
tion of both post-deposit equilibrium stability 
requirements it is clear that the set of cec im-
poses a stricter constraint on the mechanism 
than the icc. Thus, the stability conditions (at 
least a subset of them) defined by the set of cec 
would be violated if the icc binds in equilib-
rium with equality. 
 
It should be emphasized that the entire opti-
mization problem is based on the set of ex-
pected realizations of the random variable and 
its induced probability distribution. The se-
quential structure of the service constraint 
defining the solution mechanism is directly 
generated by these variables through the opti-
mization problem faced by the bank. More-
over, the equilibrium of the model is deter-
mined by the effects of bΛ  and )( bf Λ  on the set 
of cec. These constraints do not only allow for 
the implementability of the mechanism ob-
tained as an optimal solution to the optimiza-
tion problem, but define its stability. As we 
will show, the set of cec guarantees the exis-
tence of no-run equilibria within the set of 
Bayesian games generated by the mechanism, 
such that we can rely on the revelation princi-
ple to eliminate any possible attack from the 
optimal communication strategies of deposi-
tors.  
 
2.3 UPDATING THE BAYESIAN BELIEFS OF 
DEPOSITORS 
 
Assume from now on that the prior set of ex-
pected realizations, bΛ , and the probability 
function defined on it, )( bf Λ , are no longer 
common knowledge in period zero and may 
differ between the bank and its depositors. 
This restriction allows for heterogeneous be-
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liefs among agents, caused by differences be-
tween the set of expected realizations (and its 
associated probability function) defining the 
optimal mechanism and the set of possible 
realizations considered by depositors.16 The 
latter set equals either {1,...,N}, if agents have 
no information about the possible realizations 
of λ, i.e. agents exhibit total aggregate uncer-
tainty, or aΛ , if information differentials lead 
to different expected sets of realizations. We 
will restrict attention to aΛ  information sets 
generated by mean preserving spreads on the 
set of expected realizations observed by the 
bank. Such a restriction represents a natural 
economic framework to analyze information 
differentials. This is not equivalent to affirm 
that this restriction is either necessary or suffi-
cient to generate rational self-contained runs. 
Finally, assume that, given the informational 
advantage that the bank may develop over its 
depositors, bΛ  and )( bf Λ  define the correct 
expected state of the world.  
 
Consider the set of realizations expected by 
the agents before depositing, aΛ , and its asso-
ciated subjective probability function )( aaf Λ . 
Define ),|( wai pf λλ  as the updated Bayesian be-
liefs of depositors conditional on the agent 
being patient, p, and the number of withdraw-
ing agents observed, wλ ,  
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with an updated subjective probability for each 
agent defined by  
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where aa
i Λ∈λ . The probability )|( waif λλ  repre-
sents the private beliefs of depositors about the 
possible states of the world defined within 
their subjective set of realizations, aa
i Λ∈λ , after 
observing wλ  agents in line. These beliefs are 
directly based on the probability function as-
                                                 
16 Heterogeneous expectations are justified as a direct conse-
quence of information differentials between the bank and its 
depositors. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) rely on differences 
in the risk aversion coefficient of agents to justify heterogeneity 
in the acquisition of information. We could also assume that 
financial institutions have easier access to information sources 
due to scale economies reducing the acquisition costs of infor-
mation relative to individual agents, or that they have private 
incentives, either altruistic or egoistic, to develop an informa-
tional advantage over their depositors. 
signed by the agents to the set of possible 
states, )( aaf Λ .  
 
Beliefs are updated for each value of aw
aΛ= #,...,1 λλ , 
with a
aΛ#λ  representing the supremum of the set 
aΛ . From the point of view of a given deposi-
tor, the length of the line represents the com-
munication strategies of the remaining agents, 
since we are considering equilibria in pure 
strategies and actions are equivalent to mes-
sages used as noiseless signal of the state. 
Without a sunspot variable coordinating all 
depositors on a run, withdrawals behave as 
public signals reflecting the strategies of de-
positors. An observed signal, in the form of 
wλ , modifies the beliefs of agents regarding the 
state of the world conditional on aa
i Λ∈λ . Indi-
vidual agents assume all remaining depositors 
to share their set of beliefs and act accordingly. 
Thus, agents expect other depositors to mis-
represent their types when there exists an in-
centive to do so themselves. Agents are, at the 
same time, aware of the fact that by attacking 
the bank they will be modifying the final set of 
realizations, and the behavior of other deposi-
tors who react to their signal. The subjectively 
updated Bayesian probability function of de-
positors must reflect all the described informa-
tion properties of the withdrawing line. 
 
The term )|( aipf λ  measures the subjective de-
gree of pessimism inherent to each agent.17  
 
We assume a neutral distribution through the 
paper, but the model can easily be extended to 
analyze the effects of pessimism, and for that 
matter optimism, on the deposit and with-
drawal decisions of agents.  
 
                                                 
17 Neutrality of the distribution is usually assumed under risk, 
)]/(1[)|( Npf ai
a
i λλ −= . However, in an uncertainty context, 
associated with a subjective probability function )(⋅uf , prospect 
theory suggests pessimistic biases in the subjective expectations 
of agents, )|()|( ai
a
iu pfpf λλ < , for *λλ <ai , with ],0[* N∈λ  
defined by each depositor. In words, agents overvalue the sub-
jective probability of being affected by the shock in relatively 
good states of the world, i.e. realizations of the random variable 
below a given cut off point *λ , and undervalue it in the bad 
ones. For additional prospect theory results and a quantitative 
analysis of the subjective parameters see Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), and Tversky and Kahneman(1992). 
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3. Post-Deposit Coordination 
Games 
 
3.1 PRE AND POST-DEPOSIT EQUILIBRIA 
 
Despite the existence of two differentiated 
coordination games, recognized by Adao and 
Temzelides (1998), and Peck and Shell (2003), 
the unique equilibrium (in pure strategies) 
defined by the depositing decision of agents is 
assumed to pervade through both games, 
unless altered by an exogenous sunspot shock 
in the interim period. There exists a tacit 
agreement regarding the unique run-free Nash 
equilibrium of the pre-deposit coordination 
game. Agents do not deposit funds if they ex-
pect a run in the interim period, see Postle-
waite and Vives (1987), unless it is caused by a 
sunspot variable taking place with low enough 
probability. The post-deposit game is therefore 
identical to the pre-deposit one, and preserves 
the same run-free equilibrium. This result 
relies heavily on the assumed homogeneity of 
beliefs (and strategies) among depositors, and, 
particularly, between depositors and the bank. 
Once information and beliefs are allowed to 
differ, the resulting equilibrium supports ra-
tional self-contained runs expected by the 
agents before depositing, not necessarily gen-
erated by an exogenous sunspot variable.   
 
3.2 THE SET OF POST-DEPOSIT GAMES 
 
The solution to the bank optimization problem 
is given by a mechanism, ))(( bfm Λ , consisting 
of a vector of optimal and feasible state con-
tingent allocations defined for each value in 
the set },{ 21
bbb λλ=Λ , and their corresponding 
probabilities )}(),({)( 21
bbb fff λλ=Λ 18   
 
))(),(),(),(())(( 2
2
21
1
22
2
11
1
1
bbbbb ccccf λλλλ=Λm  
 
where )( 1
1
1
bc λ  denotes the consumption offered 
to the first b
1λ  agents in line who declare being 
impatient, while )( 2
2
1
bc λ  is allocated to each of 
the remaining impatient agents in line, in case 
of an attack up to the point where the bank 
                                                 
18 The dimension of 
bΛ  has been chosen to simplify the presen-
tation without loss of generality. The main results of the paper 
hold for any n-dimensional, Nn ≤ , set of realizations, as long 
as the mechanism allows for the existence of runs on the bank. 
At the same time, since optimality requires 
bb
i
b
i
ib
i
i cc Λ∈∀== λλλ  ,0)()( 1221 , subscripts will denote from 
now on both the type of depositor and consumption period. 
runs out of reserves.19 The remaining alloca-
tions composing the mechanism vector, 
2,1 )),(( 2 =ic bii λ , define the consumption given to 
patient agents in period two, depending on the 
number of withdrawing agents in period one. 
 
The strategies of depositors, based on their 
subjective expected payoffs, defining the Nash 
equilibria of the set of post-deposit games gen-
erated by the bank through ))(( bf Λm , depend 
on wλ . That is, a signalling Bayesian game will 
be played by all patient depositors for each 
aw
aΛ≤ #λλ . The post-deposit game theoretical set-
ting induced by the mechanism is no longer 
unique, as is the general case considered in the 
literature, but composed by a set of signalling 
Bayesian coordination games. Denote this set 
by Ξ. The dependence of the expected payoffs 
of depositors, defining each game within Ξ, on 
the value of wλ  must be reflected in the payoff 
matrix of the corresponding game, denoted by 
)( wλχ , which is given by  
                                                 
19 The problem presented by suspension of convertibility and 
other alternative run-proof mechanism design policies is not a 
simple one. Their effect on the final depositing decision of 
agents depends on the type of information friction generating 
the biased beliefs of depositors. Announcing suspension before 
agents deposit becomes optimal with biased subjective probabili-
ties on a unique sunspot variable realization, but it is not neces-
sarily optimal if beliefs are generated through a mean preserving 
spread on the expected set of realizations. See Section 5 for a 
more detailed analysis of this topic. 
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))](([ 1
wrcuE λ  corresponds to the expected 
payoff, in utility terms, received by an agent if 
all depositors attack the bank in period one. 
The superscript in Nλ  indicates the number of 
agents withdrawing funds in period one, i.e. 
the length of the withdrawing line, when no 
subscript is used to define the variable. Given 
N and bΛ , wN
bN
λλ
λλ
−
−− 11  refers to the probability 
of reaching the line within the interval 
],( 11
−Nb λλ  if a general run on the bank takes 
place after observing wλ  agents in line. All 
agents are assumed identical in this respect. 
There is no agent with an exogenous a priori 
advantage allowing him to reach the line be-
fore others do.  
 
)( 2
rcu  derives directly from the budget con-
straint of the bank, and represents the utility 
value of consumption for the last patient agent 
if all other depositors have declared to be im-
patient.  
 withdraw not withdraw 
withdraw ))](([ ))],(([ 11
wrwr cuEcuE λλ ))]1(([ )),1(( 21 ++ wpwp cuEcu λλ  
not withdraw ))](([ ),( 112
wrr cuEcu λ−  ))](([ ))],(([ 22 wnrwnr cuEcuE λλ  
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Note that if  
 
0)(
1
1
1 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ − ∑ −
=
N
w
wcN λ
 
a patient depositor who knows to be the last 
agent in line has no incentive to misrepresent 
her type. The last depositor, if patient, receives 
in period two the return of whatever remains 
after all the other agents have withdrawn in-
vested in the long run technology.   
 
))1(( 1 +wpcu λ  is the utility obtained by a patient 
depositor who withdraws funds in period one 
after observing a line of length wλ , while the 
remaining patient agents do not misrepresent 
their types simultaneously.  
 
))](([ 2
wnrcuE λ  and ))]1(([ 2 +wpcuE λ  follow from the 
set of cec conditions defining the no-run equi-
libria of all possible post-deposit games played 
by patient depositors20  
 
(2) .  )),1(())](([ #12
awwpwnr
acucuE Λ≤∀+≥ λλλλ
 
Differentiating rational self-contained runs 
from sunspot-based general ones requires the 
run equilibria of all games, )( wλχ  with 
aw
aΛ= #,...,1 λλ , to be defined on a unilateral basis 
and not to involve the entire subset of patient 
depositors. We want to prevent the generation 
of herds and allow for agents to distribute the 
attacks depending on the value of wλ . Thus, 
the set of run equilibria must consist of self-
contained attacks, based on 
  ))],(([))1(( 21
wnrwp cuEcu λλ >+ that do not spread to 
the entire subset of patient depositors, which 
is the case as long as  
 
.  ))],(([))]1(([
#12
awwrwp
acuEcuE Λ≤∀>+ λλλλ  
 
3.3 COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES 
 
This section introduces formally the commu-
nication strategies of patient depositors defin-
ing the possible equilibria of each game within 
the set of post-deposit games generated by 
                                                 
20 When defining ))](([ 2
wnrcuE λ , ))]1(([ 2 +wpcuE λ , 
))](([ 1
wrcuE λ  and )( 2rcu , we have assumed that all impatient 
agents up to )1(
#
−≤Λ Na aλ  are paid )( 221 bc λ , and that the last 
remaining depositor receives a strictly positive consumption 
allocation in case of a general run. While this is not necessarily 
true, it has been done to simplify the matrix entrances and does 
not affect the results presented. 
each value of aw
aΛ≤ #λλ . Agents are able to calcu-
late in period zero, before knowing their type, 
the set of all possible games they will be facing 
in period one depending on the number of 
withdrawing agents in line. This is the case 
since both the withdrawing and depositing 
decisions are based on the expected set of 
equilibria subjectively obtained by the agents 
in period zero for each Ξ∈)( wλχ , with 
aw
aΛ= #,...,1 λλ . Formally, every agent defines her 
set of strategies based on the subjective ex-
pected utilities obtained from the mechanism 
designed by the bank for all possible values of 
aw
aΛ≤ #λλ  
 
)}:))])),((|)((([{
)(},...,1{:][
#
#
awwba
aa
a
a
a
a
a
a
ffuE
FMuE
Λ
Λ
≤ΛΛ→
→Λ××
λλλ
λ
mm
 
where M corresponds to the set of mechanisms 
offered by the bank, with Mf b ∈Λ ))((m , while 
)( aaF Λ  is the set of subjective probability func-
tions defined by the agents on their expected 
set of realizations, )()( aaaa Ff Λ∈Λ . The previous 
function is a mapping from the set of alloca-
tions offered by the bank and the set of subjec-
tive beliefs held by agents to the set of ex-
pected utilities derived from the subjective 
mechanisms calculated by the depositors, 
))])),((|)((([ wbaaa ffuE λΛΛ mm , that are used to 
define the entries of the )( wλχ  payoff matrix, 
for each aw
aΛ≤ #λλ . Every subjective mechanism 
calculated for a given realization of wλ , 
))),((|)(( wbaaa ff λΛΛ mm , defines a corresponding 
expected game, )( wλχ , within the set Ξ . Thus, 
the set of games played by the agents is the 
image of a function of all pairs of the form 
))(),)),((|)((( aa
wba
aa fff ΛΛΛ λmm . 
 
The bank, endowed with the information set 
)}(,,{ bbb fN ΛΛ=Γ , designs an optimal incentive 
compatible mechanism ))(( bf Λm , using the 
following allocation rule  
 
b
b
i
k
b
i
i
k
b
bb
cf
fCF
Λ=
=
Λ
=Λ
→Λ→Λ
#,...,1
2,1
)(#2
))(())((m
)(:][)(:
λ
α
 
 
where )( bF Λ  is the set of probability functions 
that may be induced by a given set of realiza-
tions, bΛ . This rule results in the set of opti-
mal (and feasible) state contingent allocations 
that will be used to define the mechanism. 
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Note that the domains of the allocation rule 
and the optimal mechanism calculated by the 
bank have been defined in terms of )( bF Λ . This 
dependence highlights the stochastic nature of 
the optimal allocation set, the mechanism, and 
the resulting set of post-deposit games, which 
are all based on the expectations hold by the 
bank, but not necessarily by its depositors.  
 
The communication strategy of a patient de-
positor, 
aμ , defined for each Ξ∈)( wλχ , with 
aw
aΛ≤ #λλ , is given by the following map 
 
patient    },,{: anwwa ∀→Ξμ  
 
that assigns to each game )( wλχ  within Ξ  an 
equilibrium withdrawing decision, consisting 
of either withdrawing funds, w, or waiting, 
nw. To simplify notation, we will denote the 
communication strategy corresponding to the 
a-th depositor and game )( wλχ  by )( wa λμ . The 
communication profile of a patient depositor is 
given by a vector of messages (communication 
strategies) defined for each one of the games 
expected to be played in period one  
 
patient 
   ,},{))(),...,(()( #
#1
a
nww
a
a
a
a
a
a
aa
∀
∈=Ξ ΛΛ
λλμλμμ
 
The vector of messages derived from the 
communication strategies of all depositors is 
simply wλ , since the message space is equiva-
lent to the space of actions. Agents consider a 
set of optimal communication profiles formed 
by their optimal vector of messages and those 
of all remaining depositors 
 
patient    ,)}(),({ ** aaaa ∀Φ=ΞΞ −μμ  
 
where )(* Ξ−aμ  assigns an identical optimal 
communication profile to all patient deposi-
tors, given by )(* Ξaμ . This assumption is justi-
fied by the lack of communication among de-
positors, standard to this type of models, and 
the absence of any additional signals privately 
received by depositors regarding the beliefs of 
other agents, a la Morris and Shim, in the in-
terim period. The union set of optimal com-
munication profiles defining the final value of 
wλ  is given by Φ , and includes the vectors of 
messages generated by all depositors, allowing 
for heterogeneous beliefs among them.  
 
3.4 POST-DEPOSIT EQUILIBRIA SET 
 
In order to study the interim period general 
rational expectations equilibrium, we must 
consider the set of equilibria defined for each 
and every Bayesian game played by patient 
agents after depositing, Ξ∈)( wλχ , for any pos-
sible value of },...,1{ Nw ∈λ .  
 
Definition 3.1 Bayesian Equilibrium of a 
Post-deposit Game A perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of a signalling interim (post-deposit) 
game, Ξ∈)( wλχ , is given by a communica-
tion strategy, )(* wa λμ , and the corresponding 
updated beliefs ),|( wai pf λλ , such that 
Na∈∀ \ ][ bjλ , where N defines the set of all 
agents, and ][ bjλ , bj Λ= #,...,1 , stands for the 
set of agents affected by the shock, and for all 
aw
aΛ= #,...,1 λλ  
 
For the entire post-deposit game theoretical 
structure to hold, there must exist at least one 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies 
per game, defined by the optimal communica-
tion strategies of patient depositors after ob-
serving wλ  agents in line and updating their 
subjective beliefs.  
 
 17
))](),(|)(([))](),(|)(([ * wa
www
a
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which in expected utility terms translates into 
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Runs are eliminated from the communication 
strategies of depositors if, and only if, we are 
able to guarantee the existence of a non-run 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium for each and every 
post-deposit game expected to be played by 
the agents. This stability condition follows 
directly from the application of the revelation 
principle to the entire set of interim games. 
 
Definition 3.2 Revelation Principle Define 
the set of messages sent by the agents to be the 
set of withdrawing depositors, wλ , due to the 
existing equivalence between messages and 
actions. When an agent withdraws funds is 
also sending an observable message revealing 
that is impatient. The message space is then 
Nnww },{ , with Nw nww },{∈λ , and is defined by 
the communication strategies of depositors for 
each and every possible value of wλ . Consider 
the stochastic allocation rule defined by the 
bank depending on the set of expected mes-
sages, ))(( bf Λα . Assume that a mechanism is 
given, ))(( bf Λm , that both induces and is de-
fined by the expected set of messages bΛ , with 
an associated allocation function ))(( bf Λα , 
such that the set of Bayesian post-deposit 
games generated by ))(( bf Λm  has a set of 
Bayesian Nash equilibria defined by the com-
munication profile 
))(),...,(),(()( **2
*
1
*
*
w
N
www
b λμλμλμλμ λ−= , for all bw bΛ≤ #λλ , 
where all patient agents report truthfully. That 
is, for a given realization of the random vari-
able defining the true state of the economy 
bb Λ∈*λ , we have *bw λλ = , and nwwa =)(* λμ , 
Na∈∀ \ ][ *bλ , and *bw λλ ≤ .  
 
The revelation principle states that, given the 
previous Bayesian equilibrium, there exists a 
direct revelation mechanism, )'),('( αλμ w , with 
))((' bf Λ=αα , since it is a stochastic rule, such 
that )()(' * ww λμλμ = , and all the agents accepting 
the mechanism report truthfully. 
 
In other words, the revelation principle states 
that runs on the bank can be prevented, except 
if caused by a sunspot realization, as long as 
each and every post-deposit game played by 
patient depositors has a no-run Nash equilib-
rium where agents can coordinate their com-
munication strategies.  
 
We define now the set of rational expectations 
equilibria induced by ))(( bf Λm . In order to do 
so, the Bayesian equilibrium definition pre-
sented above must be integrated in a setting 
with multiple games, whose payoffs matrices 
are defined as functions of the sequential allo-
cations composing the mechanism, and the set 
of subjective beliefs held by depositors.  
 
Definition 3.3 Rational Expectations Equi-
libria of the Deposit Games A set of rational 
expectations equilibria for the corresponding 
set of deposit games, both pre and post, is 
given by an implementable mechanism de-
signed by the bank, ))(( bf Λm , defining a set of 
allocation vectors for all possible realizations 
within bΛ , and a communication profile, 
)(* wλμ , aw aΛ≤∀ #λλ , generated by the communica-
tion strategies of patient depositors, such that 
 
(i) The set of allocation vectors composing the 
mechanism maximizes the expected utility of 
depositors, ))(,( maxarg ))((* bbb fVf ΛΛ∈Λm , and 
satisfies the budget, certainty equivalent (in-
centive compatibility), and non-negativity 
constraints. ))(,( bb fV ΛΛ  is the true value func-
tion, defining the optimization problem faced 
by agents in period zero for the probability 
function, )( bf Λ , and the set of expected reali-
zations, bΛ , observed by the bank, which cor-
respond to the true expected state of the econ-
omy. 
 
(ii) The mechanism satisfies a sequential ser-
vice constraint. The consumption allocation 
received by an impatient agent in period one, 
)(1
wc λ , depends only on the number of agents 
standing before him in line, 1−wλ . The num-
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ber of allocations defining the sequential with-
drawing intervals of the mechanism, 
bb
i
b
i
ic Λ∈∀λλ ),(1 , is given by the cardinality of the 
set bΛ . 
 
(iii) The set of optimal communication pro-
files, Φ , based on the private beliefs of de-
positors for a given (optimal) mechanism 
))((* bf Λm , with  
 
patient     ,))(),...,(( #
*
1
* aa
a
a
a
a a ∀Φ∈Λλμλμ  
 
where ))(),...,((
#
*
1
* a
a
a
a aΛλμλμ  represents the vector of 
optimal communication strategies for agent a 
given the set of games generated by all the 
possible values of wλ  that can be observed 
according to her private set of expected reali-
zations, aΛ , defines a set of perfect Bayesian 
equilibria for the set of signalling games played 
in the interim period, Na∈∀ \ ][ *bλ , and 
},...,1{
#
bw
bΛ∈∀ λλ . The homogeneity assumption on 
the set of private beliefs defined among patient 
agents, )( aaF Λ , simplifies this requirement to a 
unique communication profile, since 
)()( ' Ξ=Ξ aa μμ , for all depositors 'aa ≠ , with 
Naa ∈', \ ][ *bλ .   
 
(iv) Agents exhibit Bayesian Rationality when 
updating the set of subjective beliefs used to 
define their communication strategies in each 
one of the corresponding post-deposit games, 
Ξ∈)( wλχ , with },...,1{
#
aw
aΛ∈ λλ . The set of optimal 
communication profiles, Φ , gives place to a 
set of noiseless signals represented by the 
length of the withdrawing line, wλ . These sig-
nals are used by patient depositors to update 
their beliefs about the expected state realiza-
tion and the corresponding consumption re-
ceived in period two, which derives directly 
from the set of equilibria generated by the 
optimal communication profiles within Φ  
through the expected remaining games in the 
set, Ξ∈)( wλχ , for },...,1{
#
aw
aΛ∈ λλ . Subjective beliefs 
generate the forward induced structure that 
defines the set of optimal communication pro-
files of patient depositors, giving place to the 
set of Bayesian Nash equilibria for the entire 
set of interim games.  
 
(v) The revelation principle holds when active 
throughout the entire set of post-deposit 
games. Consider the game Ξ∈)( wλχ , defined by 
patient depositors through ))((* bf Λm , and 
),|( wai pf λλ , aai Λ∈∀λ , after observing wλ  with-
drawing agents. Given the cec subjectively 
calculated by depositor for )( wλχ , nwwa =)(* λμ , 
Na∈∀ \ ][ *bλ , if there exists a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium in this game defined by the truth-
ful communication strategies of all depositors. 
However, if ))](([))1(( 21 wnrwp cuEcu λλ >+ , wwa =)(* λμ , 
Na∈∀ \ ][ *bλ . In this case, the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium of the signaling game )( wλχ  is 
given by either an unilateral attack, if 
))](([))]1(([ 12
wrwp cuEcuE λλ ≥+ , or a general run on 
the bank, if ))](([))]1(([ 12 wrwp cuEcuE λλ <+ . The 
revelation principle does not hold and cannot 
guarantee a no run (truth-telling) equilibrium 
for any subset of post-deposit games where 
))](([))1(( 21
wnrwp cuEcu λλ >+ .  
 
(vi) Given ))((* bf Λm , the set of subjectively 
updated beliefs, ),|( wai pf λλ , for all aai Λ∈λ , gen-
erating the set of optimal communication pro-
files for all patient depositors, $\Phi$, and the 
set of Bayesian Nash equilibria defined by the 
optimal communication profiles (based on aΛ  
and )( aaf Λ ) for each and every post-deposit 
game within the set Ξ , with Ξ∈)( wλχ , 
},...,1{
#
aw
aΛ∈∀ λλ , agents prefer depositing funds in 
the bank to autarky.   
 
The literature on bank runs considers a unique 
post-deposit game for a given )( bf Λ , whose no-
run equilibrium is guaranteed by a direct ap-
plication of the revelation principle. The equi-
librium set defined for the subjective set of 
signalling Bayesian games allows for bank runs 
that follow from the optimal communication 
strategies of patient depositors.  
 
3.5 MECHANISM MONOTONICITY AND SELF-
CONTAINED RUN EQUILIBRIA 
 
Sunspot variables lead to general runs on the 
bank if realized, which conditions the deposit-
ing decision of agents on the imposition of an 
exogenous constraint on their realization 
probabilities. On the other hand, given )( aaf Λ , 
bank runs must self-contain to be compatible 
with the rational deposit equilibria definition 
presented above and for agents to deposit in 
period zero. A run on the bank can be con-
tained if the mechanism allows for individual 
incentives to run for a given subset of values  
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defined within the sequential intervals induced 
by bΛ , but at the same time keeps all patient 
depositors from withdrawing simultaneously, 
given )( aaf Λ  and assuming that all agents share 
identical beliefs. That is, runs are contained if, 
after having an incentive to unilaterally mis-
represent their types, the allocation adjust-
ment process defined by the mechanism suf-
fices to coordinate the strategies of patient 
depositors back on the truth telling equilib-
rium.  
 
We will make use of the following lemma to 
illustrate the run equilibrium results presented 
in this section  
 
Lemma 3.4 Assume that a general run on the 
bank defines one of the possible equilibria for 
the set of post-deposit games, Ξ . That is, 
there exists a value of wλ  smaller than N, de-
noted by rλ , such that the bank does not have 
enough resources to honor the sequential allo-
cations of the mechanism in case of a run  
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If none of the cec within the set used to define 
the optimal mechanism binds in equilibrium,21 
all the elements composing the set of optimal 
allocations offered to both types of depositors, 
bb
i
b
i
ib
i
i cc Λ∈∀λλλ )),(),(( 21 , are monotonically de-
creasing in b
iλ .  
 
Proof. The proof for a unary realization set, 
}{ 1
bλ , is presented in Green and Lin (2003). 
They illustrate the increasing monotonicity of 
)( 1
1
1
bc λ  and )( 112 bc λ  relative to decreases in the 
value of b
1λ . Their proof derives directly from 
the assumption of a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion larger than one. The interested reader 
is referred to Lemma 1 in their paper.  
 
In order to generalize this result note that, for 
any cardinality of bΛ , if none of the cec binds 
in equilibrium, the optimization problem de-
fining the mechanism gives place to the fol-
lowing first order condition for b
bΛ#λ  
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cRucu Λ
Λ
Λ
Λ = λλ , 
                                                 
21 This assumption is made to simplify the presentation, and 
follows directly from the simulation results. 
which is identical to the equilibrium condition 
defined for a unary set. From the assumed 
concavity of u(c) and the value of R(>1) we 
obtain  
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Λ
Λ > λλ . 
 
Therefore, the consumption allocations re-
ceived by patient depositors for values of 
bw
b 1# −Λ> λλ  and a given )( ##1 b bbc ΛΛ λ  decrease mono-
tonically in wλ , since  
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which implies that )()(
1#
1#
2#
#
2
bb
b
b
b
b
cc −Λ
−Λ
Λ
Λ < λλ . A simple 
backward induction argument applied on the 
remaining equilibrium conditions delivers the 
required result. The first order optimality con-
dition defining the allocation that corresponds 
to the previous element within the realization 
set, b
b 1# −Λλ , is given by  
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implying that  
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and, therefore,  
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It follows directly from this last inequality 
that, given )(
1#
1#
1
b
b
b
c −Λ
−Λ λ , the allocation offered to 
patient depositors within the interval 
],( 1#2#
bb
bb −Λ−Λ λλ  is monotonically decreasing in 
wλ . Thus, we must have  
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21#
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−Λ
−Λ
−Λ < λλ . 
 
The same reasoning applies to all the remain-
ing allocations within the mechanism, offered 
to both patient and impatient depositors. This 
completes the proof.  
 
The introduction of a dynamic updating proc-
ess, based on wλ , in the formation of expected 
payoffs defined by patient depositors together 
with the decreasing monotonicity of 
bb
i
b
i
ic Λ∈∀λλ ),(1 , lead to the following result  
 
Theorem 3.5 Assume that the bank does not 
have enough resources to honor the sequential 
allocations composing the mechanism in case 
of a general run. If a mechanism is vulnerable 
to general runs, there exist subjective sets of 
random variable realizations, aΛ , with their 
associated probability functions, )( aaf Λ , lead-
ing to self-contained attacks on the bank.  
 
Proof. The monotonic and optimality qualities 
of bb
i
b
i
ib
i
i cc Λ∈∀λλλ )),(),(( 21 , jointly with the exis-
tence of rλ , imply that there must exist at least 
one value rp λλ <  satisfying  
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with bh Λ<# , and ap Λ∈λ . Thus, a subjective 
probability distribution leading the beliefs of 
depositors to satisfy  
 
 
for any bh Λ<# , after observing ],( 1 bibiw λλλ −∈  
agents in line, provides patient depositors with 
an incentive to unilaterally misrepresent their 
types, as long as the second inequality is not 
reversed by a posterior allocation, but does not 
necessarily degenerate in an immediate general 
run on the bank. The following payoff matrix 
represents the strategic environment on which 
the previous inequality is based  
 
-(i-λw) 
 
 
 
 
Consider the northeast corner of the matrix. 
Unilateral attacks take place if 
)]([ )1( 21
wnrwp cEc λλ >+ , and continue as long as  
 
1  with  ),1()]([ 212 >≥−++<+ − jjcjcE wNwpwp λλλλ
 
The (Bayesian) updated private beliefs hold by 
depositors for ],( 1 bibiw λλλ −∈  define a self-
contained run on the bank, that does not ex-
tend to the entire set of patient depositors, 
conditional on )]([)]1([ 12
wrwp cEcE λλ ≥+ . This sta-
bility condition guarantees the containment of 
general runs uniquely within the interval 
],( 1
b
i
b
i λλ − . The self-contained quality of bank 
runs requires that no general run is triggered 
through any of the games generated by the set 
of allocations defining the mechanism. That is, 
given the private beliefs of depositors defining 
their expected payoffs through the entire set of 
games, the following condition must be satis-
fied bw
bΛ≤∀ #λλ  
)]([))](|1([ 12
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wp cEfcE λλ ≥Λ+ , 
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where ))](|1([ 2 aawp fcE Λ+λ  represents the ex-
pected payoff received by a patient agent in 
period two if an additional withdrawal takes 
place after observing wλ  agents in line. When 
calculating this value agents must consider the 
cumulative effect that unilateral withdrawals, 
made by patient depositors through the 
mechanism intervals prior to the realization of 
wλ , have on the expected payoffs of the re-
maining depositors.  
 
The general containment condition defined 
above derives in a natural way from the game 
theoretical structure generated by 
bb
i
b
i
ib
i
i cc Λ∈∀λλλ )),(),(( 21 . To see why this is the 
case, take the payoff matrix defined by the 
lowest value of wλ  giving place to unilateral 
withdrawal incentives among patient deposi-
tors  
-(i-λw) 
 
Consider again the northeast corner of the 
matrix. Unilateral attacks by patient depositors 
take place if ))](|([ )1( 21 aawnrwp fcEc Λ>+ λλ , and per-
sist through 1+wλ  if  
 
)2())](|1([ 12 +<Λ+ wpaawp cfcE λλ , 
 
as follows directly from simple observation of 
the matrix defined below. At the same time, 
the private set of beliefs, )( aaf Λ , triggers a run 
that does not extend to the remaining patient 
depositors if )]([))](|1([ 12 wraawp cEfcE λλ ≥Λ+ . The 
payoff matrix generated after the unilateral 
attack of a patient depositor is based on 
))](|1([ 2
a
a
wp fcE Λ+λ   
-(i-(λw+1)) 
For a run to take place and, at the same time, 
remain self-contained within the interval 
],( 1
b
i
b
i +λλ , there must exist a value aaj Λ∈λ , such 
that the following relations are satisfied  
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Assume that 1+wλ  corresponds to b
i 1+λ  and the 
allocation adjustment of the mechanism for 
],()2( 211
b
i
b
i
wpc ++∈+ λλλ  is large enough to eliminate 
any unilateral incentive to withdraw funds  
 
 )]1([)2())](|1([ 112 +>+≥Λ+ wrwpaawp cEcfcE λλλ
 
If the attack is contained at 1+wλ , depositors 
do not expect a general run on the bank when 
playing )1( +wλχ  unless it is triggered by a sun-
spot. The general run containment conditions 
defined for each sequential interval composing 
the mechanism lead to the final cumulative 
containment condition  
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In this case, after agents have considered the 
cumulative effect of any possible withdrawals 
made by patient depositors within bΛ , denoted 
by #p, there are no unilateral incentives among 
the remaining patient depositors to run on the 
bank.  
 
4. Main Results 
 
There are no a priori restrictions on the private 
information sets acquired by agents in period 
zero. However, we can always define sets that 
serve exactly our purpose of generating self-
contained runs, without imposing any criteria 
on how information is obtained. The generic 
quality of the model described allows for the 
simulation of any agent type fitting precisely 
our required characteristics. This would pre-
sent us with a justification problem from an 
economic perspective. The mean preserving 
spread restriction on the information sets of 
depositors will provide us with such intuitive 
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requirement. The less transparent the financial 
system considered or, equivalently, the higher 
the information acquisition costs, the larger 
the information dispersion suffered by deposi-
tors, and, therefore, the weaker and more run-
prone the financial structure of the system 
becomes.22 
 
Communication is not allowed among agents, 
as is generally assumed in this type of models. 
However, allowing for agents to communicate 
does not necessarily eliminate the incentives of 
depositors to attack the bank. All agents ex-
pecting a self-contained run have a clear in-
centive to report the set bΛ  (together with 
)( bf Λ ) as the true expected one. This can be 
interpreted as an attempt to gain withdrawing 
advantage by decreasing the expected number 
of depositors who attack the bank. Adding 
new levels of uncertainty to the current 
framework would allow for a more complete, 
and complex, analysis of the strategic interac-
tions among depositors and their effect on the 
generation of runs.  
 
The self-fulfilling nature of the attacks does 
not contradict the rationality assumption im-
posed on the expectations formation process 
of depositors. Runs take place before the state 
of the economy is realized, which prevents 
them from being noticed by either the bank or 
its depositors until withdrawals stop. We are 
applying Adam Smith's invisible hand princi-
ple to the depositing decision of agents. De-
positors do not consider the real nature of the 
bank as long as they are able to monitor the 
withdrawing line and guarantee that the bank 
honors the mechanism offered, despite know-
ing that it is not the optimal one according to 
their information sets. If agents deposit funds 
and agree to the terms of the mechanism, it is 
because they strictly prefer the expected utility 
derived from depositing to an autarky situa-
tion. The mechanism does not transmit infor-
mation about the true expected state of the 
economy, since depositors do not know if it 
has been designed by an altruistic bank. At the 
same time, agents do not care about this fact, 
as they are not obliged to deposit, and will do 
so if, and only if, it is in their own best inter-
                                                 
22 We are not the first ones to remark the importance of informa-
tion differentials regarding current issues in international eco-
nomics. Information heterogeneity among agents has been 
assumed by Morris and Shim (1998) to explain currency crises, 
Calvo and Mendoza (2000) to analyze the portfolio diversifica-
tion and financial contagion phenomena, and van Wincoop and 
Bacchetta (2003) to study the exchange rate determination 
puzzle. 
est. With this is mind, define a bank run as 
follows  
 
Definition 4.1 A bank run is a strategic situa-
tion where the unique Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies of at least one of the subgames 
defining the post-deposit coordination envi-
ronment faced by patient depositors is given 
by either (w, nw) or (w, w). Alternatively, a 
bank run is a strategic situation where at least 
one agent has a rational incentive to deposit 
funds in period zero and misrepresent her type 
in period one for a subset of post-deposit 
Bayesian coordination games, Ξ∈)( wλχ .  
 
Mean preserving information spreads on the 
expected state of the economy provide us with 
a simple setting to study self-fulfilling, as well 
as self-contained, bank runs. The following 
section illustrates numerically the main find-
ings of this paper.  
 
4.1 NUMERICAL PROOFS 
 
This section presents a series of simulations of 
the pre and post-deposit game-theoretical stra-
tegic structures illustrating the existence of 
rational self-contained, as well as general, run 
equilibria for a given set of expected states 
observed by the bank, bΛ  (jointly with )( bf Λ ), 
and different sets of subjective beliefs hold by 
depositors, )( aaf Λ . The framework considered 
is rich enough to include states of the world 
generating attack prone and safe areas, allow-
ing for a simple comparison with the currency 
crises literature.23 
 
We consider a framework with 100 agents 
(potential depositors), a unique bank, an exo-
genously fixed (as of period zero) interest rate 
of 5 percent, i.e. R=1.05, and a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion given by α=2. It should 
be noted that none of the main results ob-
tained relies on the particular values assigned 
to these variables, which remain within the 
reasonable limits defined in the literature, see 
Peck and Shell (2003), and Chari and Jaganna-
than (1988). Unless stated otherwise, the true 
set of expected states observed by the bank is 
given by bΛ ={30, 50}, with its corresponding 
associated set of probabilities )( bf Λ ={0.8, 0.2}. 
These state values are chosen without loss of 
generality, and any mean preserving spread 
over the set of expected states defined in a 
                                                 
23 Simulation details and Matlab codes are available from the 
author upon request. 
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setting with multiple (>2) sequential alloca-
tions gives place to similar attack areas and 
does not affect the results obtained. In other 
words, runs do not depend on the number of 
contracts, but on the information spread suf-
fered by depositors. This is not to say that we 
can always justify runs based on beliefs differ-
entials independently of the number of alloca-
tions. For instance, not all demand deposit 
contracts allow for the existence of runs, either 
general or self-contained. Besides, even though 
attacks can be generated in a framework with 
N allocations, one per agent, it is unrealistic to 
assume that are triggered by information dif-
ferentials between the bank and its depositors. 
Sunspots provide a much better justification in 
this case.  
 
The optimal sequential allocations composing 
the mechanism for bΛ ={30, 50}, with 
)( bf Λ ={0.8, 0.2}, are given by  
 
)( 1
1
1
bc λ =1.0162 with associated utility ))(( 111 bcu λ =-
0.984058, 
)( 2
2
1
bc λ =1.0105 with associated utility ))(( 221 bcu λ =-
0.989609. 
 
The expected utility derived from remaining in 
autarky, if agents use the same information set 
as the bank to calculate their expected payoffs, 
equals  
 
eu(aut)=-0.968571, 
 
which is lower than the expected utility ob-
tained from depositing  
 
eu(dp)=-0.968446. 
 
If no run is expected in period one, or is ex-
pected with low enough probability, agents 
have an incentive to deposit their funds in the 
bank, given identical information sets.  
 
Assume that agents observe a mean preserving 
spread state set defined over the true expected 
state set of the economy. That is, given bΛ  and 
)( bf Λ , agents observe aΛ  and )( aaf Λ , such that 
ab Λ≠Λ , )()( aab ff Λ≠Λ , and 
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j
a
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i
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i ff
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with bbb
i i Λ=∀Λ∈ #,...,1,λ , and aaaj j Λ=∀Λ∈ #,...,1,λ . 
 
The subjective payoff structure defined by 
potential depositors relies heavily on the cho-
sen probability function, )( aaf Λ . While this 
idea is intuitively clear, the depositing strategic 
framework conditional on expected self-
contained runs is entirely based on the relative 
realizations and probabilities composing the 
set of expected states observed by depositors. 
That is, the existence of self-contained run 
areas and the respective depositing decisions 
of agents depend on the relative expected state 
of the economy.  
 
Proposition 4.2 If a mechanism is vulnerable 
to general runs, there exists an interval of 
withdrawing depositors, which we refer to as 
self-contained run area, such that, any mean 
preserving spread probability function on the 
state of the economy, whose support includes 
a subset of expected realizations defined 
within this interval, may lead to a self-
contained run on the bank. Alternatively, any 
set of beliefs that, after observing wλ  with-
drawing agents, leads to an expected utility 
falling within the values that correspond to the 
variables delimiting the self-contain run area, 
may trigger a self-contained run on the bank. 
 
Proof. This proposition follows directly from 
Theorem 3.5. We calculate here the exact val-
ues defining the self-contained run area for 
))((* bf Λm , with bΛ ={30, 50} and )( bf Λ ={0.8, 
0.2}. Consider again the utility derived from 
the optimal consumption allocations compos-
ing the mechanism  
 
))(( 1
1
1
bcu λ =-0.984058, 
))(( 2
2
1
bcu λ =-0.989609. 
 
The lower and upper bounds delimiting the 
interval that gives place to the self-contained 
run area, ],[ Mm λλ , are based on the above utility 
values  
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The solutions to both equations are given by 
mλ =71.3988 and Mλ =74.6254. Note that for 
an attack to be self-contained the maximum 
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number of patient agents expected to misrep-
resent their type cannot exceed the width of 
the self-contained run interval.24 Any subjec-
tive set of beliefs whose support includes a 
subset of realizations defined within the inter-
val [72,74], or giving place (after observing wλ  
withdrawing agents) to an expected utility 
(from reporting truthfully) that falls between 
))(( 1
1
1
bcu λ  and ))(( 221 bcu λ , may trigger a self-
contained run on the bank.  
 
Theorem 4.3 If a mechanism is vulnerable to 
general runs, there exists a set of mean pre-
serving spread probability functions defined 
on the expected state of the world, bΛ  and 
)( bf Λ , such that the subjective realization sets 
and beliefs these spreads give place to, aΛ  and 
)( aaf Λ , lead to self-contained attacks on the 
bank. Given the expected self-contained run 
that could take place in the interim period, 
agents deposit their funds in period zero. That 
is, the expected utility derived from depositing 
conditional on the possible self-contained run 
is strictly higher than the expected utility from 
remaining in autarky.  
 
Proof. It must be emphasized that, while the 
self-contained run area is defined by the inter-
val ],[ Mm λλ  presented in Proposition 4.2, self-
contained runs do not take place within this 
interval, whose effect is restricted to the up-
dated Bayesian beliefs of depositors, but in the 
attack area defined by ],( biai λλ  (the equality in 
subindexes is based on the numerical exam-
ples illustrated through the proof). We assume 
that patient depositors expecting a self-
contained run are not able to withdraw as soon 
as a
iλ  is realized, but must wait to observe 1+aiλ  
agents in line before attacking. That is, patient 
agents cannot anticipate the realization of the 
state before receiving the corresponding signal 
through wλ .  
 
Consider the self-contained run area described 
in Proposition 4.2. As already stated, for the 
run to be self-contained, the maximum num-
ber of depositors expected to attack cannot 
exceed the width of [72, 74]. With this restric-
tion in mind, define the following mean pre-
serving spread on the true expected state 
 
aΛ ={28, 72} with )( af Λ ={0.8636, 0.1364}. 
 
                                                 
24 Though necessary, this condition is clearly not sufficient. 
Given this information set, the rhs of the cec 
calculated for the first 28 withdrawing agents 
delivers an expected utility value of  
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which is higher than ))(( 1
1
1
bcu λ =-0.984058, so no 
attack takes place. The second term defined in 
))(( 1
aceceu λ  must account for the effect that a 
self-contained run would have on the final 
number of expected withdrawing depositors 
and the corresponding consumption alloca-
tion. However, )28,|( 2 ≤wa pf λλ  must be calcu-
lated for a2λ =72 to be consistent with the sub-
jective beliefs of depositors. 
 
If an additional agent is observed withdrawing 
after 28 depositors have withdrawn funds, the 
subjective beliefs of the remaining patient de-
positors must be updated accordingly, which 
modifies the expected utility value obtained 
from the rhs of the cec to  
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a
wnra fcuEceceu Λ>= λλ =-0.986639 
))(( 2
2
1
bcu λ =-0.989609 < ))(( 2aceceu λ  < ))(( 111 bcu λ = 
-0.984058, 
 
triggering a self-contained run on the bank, 
see the Self-Contained Attack Annex 1. Given 
the self-contained run that would take place if 
a
2λ  is realized, agents deposit in period zero iff 
the expected utility derived from depositing  
 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
))1(()1(
))(()1())((
)(
))((
))((
)()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
12
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
a
a
b
ba
b
b
a
a
a
a
b
a
a
a
cu
N
N
cu
N
cu
N
f
cu
N
N
cu
N
fdpeu
λλ
λλλλλ
λ
λλ
λλ
λ
 
is strictly higher than the expected utility from 
remaining in autarky  
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This condition is satisfied for aΛ ={28, 72} and 
)( af Λ ={0.8636, 0.1364}, since  
eu(dp)=-0.968537 > eu(aut)=-0.968572. 
 
We perform the same analysis for an alterna-
tive expected state of the world, given by 
bΛ ={20, 40} and )( bf Λ ={0.8, 0.2}. The optimal 
consumption allocations composing the 
mechanism are  
 
)( 1
1
1
bc λ =1.0187 with associated utility ))(( 111 bcu λ = 
-0.981643, 
)( 2
2
1
bc λ =1.0137 with associated utility ))(( 221 bcu λ = 
-0.986485, 
 
defining a self-contained run interval delimited 
by mλ =66.2142 and Mλ =69.5472. Consider the 
following mean preserving spreads on the ex-
pected state of the economy, and the corre-
sponding depositing decisions of agents  
 
aΛ ={18, 67} with )( af Λ ={0.8776, 0.1224} 
eu(dp)=-0.963791 > eu(aut)=-0.963808 
 
aΛ ={18, 68} with )( af Λ ={0.88, 0.12} 
eu(dp)=-0.963793 > eu(aut)=-0.963810 
 
Agents deposit despite the self-contained run 
that would take place if a2λ  is realized.  
 
5. A note on Suspension of 
Convertibility 
 
If suspension is announced as part of ))((* bf Λm  
in the above numerical examples, all agents 
expecting realizations of the random variable 
higher than b2λ  will not deposit funds, since a 
payment of zero is received with positive 
probability. However, the mean preserving 
spread distribution defined on the true set of 
expected states may not be wide enough to 
trigger a self-contained run. In this case, 
agents would deposit if the bank does not an-
nounce suspension, but do not expect or gen-
erate a (self-contained) run in the interim pe-
riod. Therefore, given the unique (endoge-
nous) stochastic variable defined within the 
homogeneous information spread framework 
studied, it can be easily shown that  
 
Proposition 5.1 In an environment with ei-
ther one or multiple banks, suspension of con-
vertibility prevents all self-contained runs 
based on information differentials if it is an-
nounced after agents deposit. Moreover, sus-
pension eliminates any run based on the reali-
zation of an exogenous sunspot variable if 
)()( 1
1
1#
#
2
bb cc b
b λλ ≥ΛΛ .  
 
If suspension is not announced and a sunspot-
based general run is expected to take place, the 
maximum probability of such an event that 
allows for agents to deposit is given by the 
solution to  
 
(3)   ,E[U(aut)]
 E[U(run)] r)]+f(run)f(nr)E[U(n ≥
 
 
where f(run) defines the subjective probability 
assigned to the realization of an exogenous 
run-triggering sunspot variable, and f(nr)=1-
f(run). Given N=100, bΛ ={30, 50} and 
)( bf Λ ={0.8, 0.2}, this probability is equal to 
0.002641 if both last agents in line are patient, 
and 0.0025145 if they are both impatient.25 
Any agent expecting a sunspot-based run to 
take place with a subjective probability higher 
than 0.002641 will not deposit funds, unless 
suspension is imposed and constitutes an effi-
cient containment policy.  
 
Proposition 5.2 In an environment with ei-
ther one or multiple banks, suspension of con-
vertibility prevents all sunspot-based runs if it 
is announced before agents deposit and  
 
)()( 1
1
1#
#
2
bb cc b
b λλ ≥ΛΛ  
 
On the other hand, any bank imposing an effi-
cient suspension policy as part of ))((* bf Λm  
attracts all agents whose f(run) is higher than 
0.002641, as equation (3) would be satisfied 
for any subjective value assigned to f(run). 
Thus, given a unique endogenous stochastic 
variable, multiple banks, and an efficient sus-
pension policy, banks should coordinate the 
timing of their announcements in order to 
implement the optimal mechanism among all 
                                                 
25 An equal distribution policy between the depositors remaining 
after rλ  is reached has been assumed. 
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agents. The current theoretical framework 
supports such an optimality requirement due 
to its simplicity and the fact that it consists of 
a unique banking cycle.  
 
Assume that a second (endogenous) stochastic 
variable, given by R, is added to the current 
model such that the allocations composing the 
mechanism are also based on its expected 
value. The realization of R is assumed to be 
observed in the final (second) period, but in-
terim signals about its expected value are re-
ceived by a subset of depositors, as proposed  
by Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988). Clearly, 
our theoretical framework is compatible with 
this extension, within which suspension does 
not constitute an efficient containment policy 
per se, since it could be used to contain runs 
generated by a fundamental variable. At the 
same time, modifying the assumed utility func-
tion to allow for the existence of depositors 
with highly biased sunspot probabilities would 
provide us with a formal strategic scenario 
where the containment of fundamental, sun-
spot and information based runs determines 
the dynamic stability of the banking system.  
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